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Abstract: This paper considers the historical relationship between states, markets 
and power by examining three very different recent books that deal with various 
aspects of the contemporary international political economy. The point that 
emerges from this review is that states still matter, but their influence may be 
expressed in new and distinctive ways. 
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Anyone taking even the most perfunctory interest in current affairs might be forgiven 
for thinking that we live in a time of profound, perhaps unprecedented, change. The 
emergence of the United States as the world’s first ‘unipolar’ power, the re-
emergence of security as the key concern of policymakers across the industrialised 
world, and the desire of American policymakers to assert themselves unilaterally, 
both militarily and economically, seem to have fundamentally transformed 
contemporary international relations. For those of us who thought that the end of the 
Cold War meant that geo-economics had decisively and permanently trumped geo-
politics—in the ‘developed’ world, at least—these are sobering and surprising times. 
 
In retrospect, the 1990s are beginning to look like something of an anomaly. Many of 
that decade’s preoccupations already seem weirdly anachronistic, partly because of 
the apparent resurgence of the American economy and the relative decline of much of 
East Asia’s. Whether America will continue to grow and Asia to decline is a moot 
point. What we can say is that many of the defining issues of the ’90s—the 
intensification of ‘globalisation’, heightened concern about economic competition, 
and debates about the appropriate role of the state—remain critical. Recent events 
have not diminished their importance; indeed, these issues are more significant 
precisely because they are simultaneously being redefined and downplayed as a 
consequence of the current obsession with security. What the current historical 
juncture does usefully remind us of, however, is the need to place debates about 
economic development and political organisation in a wider historical and geopolitical 
framework. 
 
William Keylor’s World of Nations provides just such a framework. The book 
promises to provide ‘an analytical narrative of the origins, evolution, and end of the 
Cold War’; it does that and more—all in around 400 pages. There’s a surprising 
amount of detail given the size of the book and the fact that Keylor does not confine 
his analysis to the main arenas of Cold War conflict and contestation, but devotes 
separate chapters to a consideration of the period’s impact on the Middle East, Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa. What emerges is a comprehensive introduction to a 
critically important, if somewhat doom-laden period. Keylor is principally concerned 
with the systemic, the geo-political, and the elites who influenced high profile 
‘events’. It is remarkable, revealing, and slightly optimism-inducing to remember that 
for many of the ordinary people conspicuously absent from this sort of history, the 
Cold War was suffused with the background fear that the world was, at best locked 
into an endless Manichean struggle for dominance between two overbearing, over-
armed superpowers, and at worst headed for a collective sticky end. That fate, at least, 
seems less likely, even if some of the underlying strategic dynamics are proving more 
durable. 
 
Keylor explains both the evolution of the Cold War itself and the abrupt, largely 
unforseen demise of the Soviet Union that brought it to an end. The book’s strength is 
in detailing the sort of shifting geopolitical forces that underpinned this pivotal event. 
Keylor is less concerned with—and so less convincing about—the ‘low’ politics of 
economic development and interaction; ‘globalisation’, for example, appears only 
briefly in a short epilogue. Similarly, the ‘end of the Japanese miracle’, merits slightly 
more than one page, while ‘Afghanistan under siege’, warrants nearly ten, and clearly 
reflects the author’s view about the importance of the unfolding ‘war on terror’ and 
military matters more generally. These are, of course, matters of judgement and not 
necessarily a serious criticism of what is an impressive, useful and concise 
introduction to the post-war period. However, the fate of the Japanese economy and 
its impact on both the economic and strategic development of Northeast Asia will be, 
I would have thought, of greater long-term significance than anything that happens in 
Afghanistan.  
 
The other books reviewed here, by contrast, are mostly concerned with the 
‘economic’ issues that explain both the decline of Japan and the resurgence of the 
United States, although both place them in a much wider canvass than such a 
description might imply. As an ex-Director General of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), Mike Moore’s A World Without Walls is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a paean to 
the merits of trade liberalisation and greater international economic integration. 
Moore regards the WTO, which he calls ‘the crown jewel of multilateralism’ (p. 109), 
as a crucial force for promoting economic development across both the developed and 
developing world. He dismisses criticism of the Doha round of trade negotiations 
(which he oversaw) from an increasingly prominent and active sector of transnational 
civil society as ‘a cruel self-serving lie orchestrated by selfish observers and self-
appointed critics who need to maintain the rage of their supporters to raise funds’ (p. 
134). It is painfully clear from such remarks that, despite Moore’s devoting a chapter 
to the importance of ‘engaging civil society’, this will not be an easy task.  
 
To his credit, Moore makes a detailed and persuasive case for greater economic 
integration. At one level there’s not much to argue about: the merits of greater 
economic interdependency seem simply overwhelming. Whether it’s simply the 
benefits that flow from greater economic specialisation or the—arguably even more 
important—impact increased economic integration appears to have on the behaviour 
of states, there are powerful arguments for transnational economic integration. The 
European Union remains the quintessential exemplar of the potentially pacifying 
effect of economic cooperation. But the EU also reminds us that the rich world is 
frequently prepared to use its power to create ‘indefensible’ (p. 170) trade barriers to 
the detriment of the developing world and the international economic system more 
generally. The real debate, therefore, has always been about the rules, both formal and 
informal, that govern the international economic system: who makes them, and who 
do they benefit? Moore recognises that international financial institutions, including 
the WTO, suffer from a lack of legitimacy and popular support, and are consequently 
unrepresentative and in need of reform. But his proposed solution—for ‘a small group 
of leaders to catalyse the issue of democratic deficit’ (p. 232)—looks like part of the 
problem rather than the solution. 
 
A theme linking all three books is the role of the state. The last line of Keylor’s book, 
filled as it is with the actions of states and their leaders, would have us believe that 
‘reports of the demise of the state are premature’ (p. 418). Moore, too, is conscious of 
the continuing importance of states, but is much less sanguine about it. For Moore, 
‘What has given government a bad name is corruption, short-termism and poor 
delivery systems’ (p. 214). Consequently, public-private delivery systems are ‘the 
way of the future’. Although Moore is clearly enamoured of the benefits of market 
forces, he does recognise that states remain important. Just how potentially important 
states remain is made clear in the collection States in the Global Economy, edited by 
prominent Australian academic Linda Weiss. 
 
Weiss’s book is much more theoretically informed and sophisticated than either of the 
other two, and builds on her widely acclaimed earlier work The Myth of the Powerless 
State. The central thesis of the previous book, and one of the key ideas explored in the 
new volume, is that the state remains a powerful institution and a central determinant 
of comparative economic outcomes—even in the sort of ‘globalised’ economy Moore 
so enthusiastically describes. Indeed, Weiss goes further, arguing that ‘the global 
economy does not preclude a role for national governance, but tends to increasingly 
demand it’ (p. 245). Where Moore sees states as potential obstacles to economic 
development, Weiss and her co-authors argue in compelling detail that states still 
have a surprising degree of autonomy or ‘room to manoeuvre’, and that if they fail to 
use such opportunities, their respective national economies will be at a competitive 
disadvantage. 
 
States in the Global Economy is important because it links theoretical claims with 
detailed case studies across a range of economic sectors and countries. Weiss 
contributes three chapters, providing both the theoretical backbone of the book and a 
persuasive riposte to those who claim that the state is in terminal decline. Weiss 
concedes that earlier forms of ‘statist’ rule are being replaced by forms of ‘governed 
interdependence’, characterised by ‘public-private partnerships and alliances, policy 
networks, information exchange, and self-regulation under the state’s goal-setting 
auspices’ (p. 308). But she argues that these new ways of doing things are 
restructuring, not negating governmental influence.  
 
Weiss and her co-authors develop this basic model of domestic reconfiguration in 
response to global competitive pressures through case studies of France, Thailand, 
China, India, East Asia generally, and of the telecommunications and finance sectors. 
The collection also includes important analyses of the taxation and welfare systems of 
Europe and East Asia, which suggest that states retain the capacity to raise and spend 
money in distinctive ways that are sharply at odds with the idea of a ‘race to the 
bottom’ and an inevitable loss of policy autonomy.  
 
Valuable as this collection is, however, there are some noteworthy gaps. The Japanese 
and American experiences are briefly examined as part of a discussion of 
telecommunication sector reform, but both merited much more extensive 
consideration in my view: the United States is, after all, the key exemplar and 
champion of an alternative market-driven model of economic development, while 
Japan pioneered the interventionist model that is apparently in serious trouble and 
which has—to some extent, at least—become a self-serving obstacle to much needed 
reforms. Likewise, some consideration of the Australian and New Zealand 
experiences might also have been useful for comparative purposes given their 
enthusiastic and pioneering adoption of neoliberal reform; at the very least it would 
have boosted the book’s appeal in Weiss’s own country. 
 
The key continuity in the post-war international order that all these books implicitly 
or explicitly highlight is that states still matter. No surprise there, perhaps, especially 
at a time when the making and unmaking of states is of critical concern to 
international policy-making elites. But other continuities emerge from these volumes 
which, while less dramatic and visible than recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
remind us of both the continuing importance of political and economic power, and of 
the encompassing geopolitical context within which states operate. China is the most 
striking example of all these possibilities. A long-term, systemic analysis of the sort 
Keylor provides illustrates the international factors that have constrained and enabled 
China’s seemingly inexorable rise. The more nuanced analysis Tianbiao Zhu offers in 
the Weiss collection, by contrast, helps us to understand how world-historical forces 
are mediated domestically, as China’s increasing ‘openness’ exposes the economy 
and the political system to new pressures.  
 
But Mike Moore is most alert to the way this long run dialectical process is affecting 
the world’s most populous country and the wider international system of which it’s a 
part. China’s accession to the WTO marks the last gasp of major alternatives to the 
highly institutionalised, rule-governed capitalist international order the United States 
effectively created—and benefited from. And yet, Moore fails to draw the big lesson 
from all this as forcefully as he might: institutionalised international economic 
integration is an important—arguably desirable—force in international affairs, but it 
has more than simply economic impacts. China may be becoming more powerful as a 
consequence of its rapid economic development, but the United States has been the 
principal beneficiary of China’s abandonment of socialism and its incorporation into 
an American-dominated international order. Power, in other words, may still be 
inextricably linked to underlying economic strength, and states may still play a part in 
determining how it develops, but power can be a more subtle, diffuse and 
institutionalised part of the international system, the impact of which may take 
decades to reveal. At a time when more dramatic, short-term displays of power are in 
vogue, it is useful to remember that there are other, more sustainable ways of 
asserting and accumulating influence. 
 
 
